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Millions of people emigrate every year in search of better economic and social 
opportunities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that emigrants may have over-optimistic 
expectations about the incomes they can earn abroad, resulting in excessive 
migration pressure, and in disappointment amongst those who do migrate. Yet there 
is almost no statistical evidence on how accurately these emigrants predict the 
incomes that they will earn working abroad. In this paper we combine a natural 
emigration experiment with unique survey data on would-be emigrants’ probabilistic 
expectations about employment and incomes in the migration destination. Our 
procedure enables us to obtain moments and quantiles of the subjective distribution 
of expected earnings in the destination country. We find a significant under-
estimation of both unconditional and conditional labor earnings at all points in the 
distribution. This under-estimation appears driven in part by potential migrants 
placing too much weight on the negative employment experiences of some 
migrants, and by inaccurate information flows from extended family, who may be 
trying to moderate remittance demands by understating incomes. 
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“Fortunes are being made by taking the life savings off gullible people in return for getting them, illegally, 
into a country like Britain. The sales talk is doubtless about a land flowing with milk and honey, and streets 
paved with gold.”           The Campaign for Political Ecology
1 
 
“…for our relatives who live in the isle, in their small minds they think that money grow[s] out of trees, 
and thus expect people overseas to provide them with their need[s]…Tongans returning home for visits 
make the situation worse by exaggerating their success and wealth and creating unrealistic expectations” 
  Tongan online discussion group (quoted in Lee,2003, p. 36) 
 
Does migration make people better off? Revealed preference would suggest yes, as 
evidenced by the large number of people choosing to pursue life in a different land each 
year. However, as the above quotes illustrate, some critics contend that migrants may 
hold unrealistic expectations of the incomes they can earn abroad. Such expectations may 
be inflated by television and film images of life abroad (Mai, 2004), and by returning 
migrants presenting an overly positive image of their lives overseas. Typical anecdotes 
tell of migrants working 14 hours a day and living six to a room returning for a three-day 
holiday at home, bringing consumer goods and spending a lot to show how successful 
they have become. As a result, it could be the case that many intending migrants 
overestimate the incomes they can earn abroad. 
 
Whether or not emigrants are overly optimistic about incomes abroad is a question of key 
policy importance, given the large and growing migration pressures around the world. 
For example, surveys of 15 to 24 year olds taken in late 2005 and early 2006 found that 
                                                 
1 http://eco.gn.apc.org/Population/immigration.html   3
91 percent of Albanians, 88 percent of Romanians, 80 percent of Ethiopians, 78 percent 
of Bangladeshis and 76 percent of Iraqis said that they would emigrate if they had the 
legal opportunity (World Bank, 2006). Eagerness to emigrate from Tonga to New 
Zealand is reflected in the excess applications for an annual immigration quota. If this 
enormous pressure to emigrate reflects mistaken beliefs about the incomes that can be 
earned abroad, then migration may lead to disappointment and frustration for the migrant, 
resulting in social problems in the destination country. But it would also suggest that 
more accurate information on earnings abroad could help lower immigration pressures.  
 
This paper uses unique survey data combined with a natural experiment in order to assess 
the accuracy of these concerns by determining whether potential emigrants have correct 
expectations about the incomes they would earn working abroad. We survey Tongans 
who applied to emigrate to New Zealand under the Pacific Access Category (PAC), 
which allows a quota of Tongans to immigrate each year, in addition to those approved 
through other categories.
2 Many more people apply than the quota allows, and so a lottery 
(referred to as a ballot) is used to determine who can emigrate through the Pacific Access 
Category.
3 We elicited expectations about employment and income in New Zealand from 
individuals in Tonga who had applied to emigrate but whose names were not chosen in 
the ballot.  Expectations were elicited by adapting the probabilistic expectations questions 
used by Dominitz and Manski (1997), Dominitz (1998) and Manski (2004).  These 
                                                 
2 The main other categories are family sponsored migration and a business/skilled category. In the 2004/05 
financial year New Zealand admitted 58 Tongans through the business/skilled category and 549 through 
family sponsored channels. Most migrants under the family sponsored categories enter as parents, children, 
or spouses/domestic partners of existing New Zealand residents.  
3 Individuals must also fulfill other eligibility requirements in order to migrate through the Pacific Access 
Category, including being aged 18 to 45, and meeting English, health and character requirements.   4
responses are then used to estimate the subjective distribution of earnings in New 
Zealand of ballot losers, which can be compared to the distribution of earnings realized 
by the ballot winners who emigrated.  
 
In contrast to the concern that migrants could be over-optimistic, we find striking 
evidence that they underestimate both the odds of being employed, and the incomes that 
they could earn if employed abroad. The mean percent chance of being employed in New 
Zealand expressed by the ballot losers is 57 percent, compared to a 75 percent actual 
employment rate among emigrant ballot winners. The means of the mean and median 
expected weekly earnings in New Zealand conditional on being employed are $337 and 
$303, much less than the actual mean ($564) and median ($515) incomes earned by the 
ballot winners. Combining the expectations of employment with the conditional earnings 
distribution, we arrive at mean unconditional expected earnings which are only 46 
percent of the actual mean earnings of immigrants in New Zealand.  
 
We show that expected earnings do predict whether or not individuals apply to migrate, 
and then explore several explanations for the underestimation of employment likelihoods 
and expected earnings. We find individuals to have lower expectations of employment in 
New Zealand if they live close to the houses of migrants who were unable to take up their 
initial job offers. This is consistent with the behavioral/psychological literature in which 
individuals place disproportionate emphasis on negative events (Taylor, 1991). We find 
that the degree of underestimation of earnings is greater when individuals have cousins, 
uncles and aunts in New Zealand compared with those who either have no relatives or   5
who have immediate family in New Zealand. The anthropological literature on the 
Tongan diaspora (Lee, 2003), shows that the extended family can place large demands 
for remittances on migrants. We view the underestimation of earnings by potential 
emigrants with extended family abroad as suggesting that immigrants mitigate this 
remittance pressure by understating their earnings abroad when communicating with their 
extended family.
4 We also find the degree of underestimation to be larger for males than 
for females. Males and females earn similar amounts in Tonga conditional on age and 
education but there is a large male earnings premium in New Zealand. This male earnings 
premium in New Zealand appears to be unknown to potential emigrants in Tonga. 
 
Our results show that potential emigrants can have very erroneous expectations about the 
incomes that can be earned abroad. We find this even in Tonga, a country where over 
three-quarters of households have at least one resident who has been to New Zealand, 
with a migrant stock in New Zealand equal to 17 percent of its population at home and 
with 75 percent of households receiving remittances. Thus we would expect that potential 
migrants in other countries, which have weaker links to destination countries and smaller 
migration information networks to draw upon, are also likely to have incorrect 
expectations about potential incomes abroad. 
 
The paper also contributes to a nascent literature on measuring expectations in 
developing countries. Early work by Ravallion (1987) asked rice traders in Bangladesh 
                                                 
4 Tonga is very remittance-dependent. According to data are from the Tongan Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (http://www.spc.int/prism/Country/TO/stats/Surveys/HIES-new/hhincom-new.htm) 
21 percent of household monetary income is from remittances. Moreover, the average immigrant household 
in our survey in New Zealand sends remittances to Tonga of $1900 cash and $600 goods per year, from an 
annual income of $33,000. Hence these are significant income flows for both senders and receivers.   6
whether they thought the price would go up, go down, or stay the same, and the amount 
of change. Expectations were found to track prices fairly well on average, although there 
was a tendency to overestimate price changes. A series of recent studies have attempted 
to elicit probabilities in agricultural contexts. These include Luseno et al (2003) and 
Lybbert et al (2005) on rainfall expectations, Santos and Barrett (2006) on herd size, and 
Hill (2006) on coffee prices. These studies have generally found reasonably accurate 
expectations, with updating in response to new information. These existing studies have 
asked expectations about events in which respondents have substantial existing 
experience. Like these studies, we find reasonably accurate expectations when asking 
Tongan immigrants in New Zealand about employment and earnings in Tonga. However, 
in contrast, we find substantial inaccuracies when we look at expectations about an 
important life decision for which individuals do not have direct experience. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Pacific 
Access Category and the survey upon which this paper is based. Section 3 outlines in 
detail how expectations are measured. Sections 4 and 5 compare expectations about 
employment and income in New Zealand to the actual distributions experienced by 
migrants. Section 6 then explores several explanations for the difference between actual 
and expected work outcomes, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Description of the Survey and Experimental Design 
The data used in this paper are from the Tongan component of the Pacific Island-New 
Zealand Migration Survey (PINZMS), a comprehensive household survey designed to   7
measure multiple aspects of the migration process. The unique feature of PINZMS is that 
it is based on a natural experiment that enables the income gains from migration to be 
estimated free of any selection bias (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2006). New 
Zealand has a special immigration category, established in 2001, called the Pacific 
Access Category (PAC), which allows an annual quota of 250 Tongans to emigrate to 
New Zealand without going through other migration routes, such as categories for family 
reunification, skilled migrants and business investors.
5 Almost ten times as many 
applications are received than the quota allows, so a ballot is used by the New Zealand 
Department of Labour (DoL) to randomly select from amongst the applicants. Once their 
ballot is selected in the lottery, applicants must then provide a valid job offer in New 




The survey design and enumeration, which was overseen by the authors in 2005, covered 
three sub-samples of applicants to the 2002/03 and 2003/04 PAC ballots: (a) individuals 
who had their names drawn in the ballot, whose residence applications were approved, 
and who had emigrated to New Zealand (ballot winners) (b) individuals who applied for 
the PAC, but whose names were not drawn in the ballot and so they were still residing in 
Tonga (ballot losers); and (c) individuals who had their names drawn in the ballot, but 
who had not emigrated to New Zealand at the time of the survey (typically because their 
                                                 
5 Specifically, any Tongan citizen aged between 18 and 45, who meets certain English, health and character 
requirements, can register to migrate to New Zealand. The person who registers is a Principal Applicant. If 
they are successful, their immediate family (spouse and children under age 18) can also apply to migrate as 
Secondary Applicants. The quota of 250 applies to the total of Primary and Secondary Applicants, and 
corresponds to about 70 migrant households. 
6 The spouse of an applicant can also be used to meet the job offer condition if they are included on the 
initial application. Applicants with dependent children must also meet a minimum income requirement. See 
McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2006) for a more detailed description of the PAC.    8
residence application was still being processed).
7  McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2006) 
show that there is little selection among ballot winners, and so we focus on a comparison 
of migrants and ballot losers here. We use the sample of ballot winners still in Tonga in 
part of the paper, and also employ a sample of individuals who did not apply to the PAC, 
collected as part of the same survey. 
 
While the survey obtains labor market information from all adults the detailed questions 
on expectations are directed only at the Principal Applicants. We have 65 Principal 
Applicants in the immigrant sub-sample and 78 in the sample whose ballot application 
was unsuccessful. Table 1 reports selected characteristics for these two groups. 
 
3. Measuring Expectations 
We elicited probabilistic expectations about employment and income in New Zealand 
from the sample of PAC ballot losers in Tonga. We will compare these expectations to 
the realized employment and income outcomes of the ballot winners, who had emigrated 
to New Zealand. We also reversed the procedure by eliciting probabilistic expectations 
about employment and income in Tonga from the immigrants in New Zealand. 
 
3.1 Survey Questions 
We follow the approach pioneered by Dominitz and Manski (1997) in measuring 
expectations. Expectations about employment in New Zealand were obtained by first 
                                                 
7 A detailed description of the sampling rules used to ensure that each sample is representative is provided 
by McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2006).   9
explaining the concept of probabilities and then asking the following question in our 
survey in Tonga: 
“I would now like you to think about what you would be doing right now if you 
were living in New Zealand. What do you think is the percent chance that you 
would be working for pay?” 
Our field experience suggests that respondents interpreted this question as pertaining to a 
situation in which they had been successful in the PAC ballot, in which case they would 
have been living in New Zealand for the same (short) duration as our migrant sample. If 
potential migrants interpreted this with regard to their expected situation after several 
years of living in New Zealand, we would expect them to overstate incomes relative to 
the realized incomes of the migrant group. As will be seen, we observe the opposite. 
 
All individuals who expressed a percent chance greater than zero of working for pay were 
then asked what they thought were the lowest weekly amount and highest weekly amount 
that they could possibly be earning in New Zealand if they were working for pay in New 
Zealand right now. As Dominitz and Manski (1997) note, these questions serve to 
decrease overconfidence problems in which respondents tend to focus too much on 
central tendencies and not consider the uncertainty in potential outcomes. They also act to 
decrease anchoring problems whereby respondents’ beliefs are influenced by the amounts 
that the interviewer asks about. 
   10
The average of the answers to the highest and lowest weekly incomes were then used by 
the interviewer to read a set of threshold levels of income, Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y4, from a 
predetermined table on the questionnaire. Respondents were then asked: 
“Thinking about the income that you would be earning if you were working in 
New Zealand right now, what do you think is the percent chance that your own 
weekly income from work would be less than Y1 New Zealand dollars?” 
The same question was then asked for thresholds of Y2, Y3 and Y4 dollars. For example, 
an individual whose average of the highest and lowest weekly incomes was $375 would 
be asked what the percent chance was that their income would be less than $300, $350, 
$400 and $450. 
 
3.2 Comparison with other approaches 
Very few surveys of migrants ask questions about expectations. It is therefore worth 
discussing the rationale for adopting the probabilistic questions used here in lieu of some 
of the more traditional qualitative and attitudinal questions. For employment, instead of 
asking the percent chance of being employed, a traditional approach could involve asking 
a question such as “what do you think your likelihood of being employed would be if you 
were living in New Zealand right now: very likely, likely, unlikely, highly unlikely”. As 
Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Manski (2004) note, such a question would have at 
least two drawbacks over the probabilistic question. The first is that it makes it very 
difficult to compare responses across individuals, since each individual can interpret 
terms such as “very likely” differently. Secondly, the coarseness of the response limits 
how much information can be obtained from such a question.   11
 
A more direct question with income would be to ask would-be emigrants how much they 
would expect to be paid if they were working in New Zealand. A variant of this is used in 
the New Immigrant Survey, which asks immigrants to state how much they think workers 
usually earn in various jobs in the United States. However, as Dominitz (1998) points 
out, it is not clear if individuals are reporting means, medians, modes, or some other 
quantiles of their subjective distributions when they respond to such questions. In 
contrast, by eliciting probabilities, we can estimate all quantiles and moments of interest 
from the subjective earnings distribution.  
 
3.3. Fitting the Subjective Earnings Distribution 
We summarize briefly here the procedure for estimating the subjective distribution of 
earnings conditional on working. We follow closely the approach of Dominitz and 
Manski (1997), where further details are provided. 
 
The four responses about percent chances for the income threshold questions are divided 
by 100 and then interpreted as points on the subjective cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of weekly labor income if they were working in New Zealand. Thus for each 
individual i, we observe 
 Fi,k  = P(yi < Yi,k|z=1, φi)   k=1,2,3,4 
where yi denotes earnings in New Zealand, Yi,1, Yi,2, Yi,3 and Yi,4 are the earnings 
thresholds that i is asked about, φi is i's information set, and z=1 denotes that the 
expectations are conditional on working in New Zealand. Let G(Y; μ, σ
2) denote the CDF   12
of a log-normal distribution, where log Y ~ N(μ, σ
2). For each respondent, we then find 
estimates μi, σi
2













k i k i Y G F σ μ
σ μ
 
Once a distribution has been fitted for each respondent, we can then obtain moments and 
quantiles of interest from the fitted distribution. We extract the mean, standard deviation, 
median and selected percentiles from the fitted distribution. The log-normal distribution 
fits the elicited points very closely. One measure of the goodness of fit is the mean 
absolute difference between the elicited and fitted distributions. This average difference 
is 0.017, and 73 out of the 77 observations have mean absolute errors below 0.05. These 
fits are closer than those achieved by Dominitz and Manski (1997) with one year ahead 
labor income in the United States. 
 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the elicited and fitted distributions for four of our 77 
respondents. Respondent 1 reported a lowest possible income in New Zealand of $100 
and highest possible income of $300. This led to them being asked about the thresholds 
{150, 200, 250, 300}, for which they gave the sequence of probabilities {0.6, 0.7, 0.75, 
0.8}. The upper left panel shows all four points lie very close to the fitted CDF, with a 
mean absolute difference between the elicited and fitted distributions of 0.003. The 
estimated median is $110 and estimated mean is $224. The estimated 75
th percentile of 
the distribution is $246, which accords well with the elicited probability of 0.75 of having 
income less than $250.  
                                                 
8 Note that if at least three of the four elicited probabilities take zero or one values, then the solution is a 
degenerate log-normal distribution. None of our respondents fell into this category, and so the least squares 
problem is well-formulated, with a unique non-degenerate solution for each individual.   13
The CDF of respondent 30 (lower left panel) illustrates a close fit, even when all the 
elicited probabilities are of 0.8 or higher. Here the lowest and highest incomes were given 
as $100 and $400, and we estimate a median of $130 and mean of $149. Such cases show 
that the midpoint of the highest and lowest values can be a misleading estimate of the 
average. The CDFs of respondents 3 and 64 (upper and lower right panels) show 
examples of less accurate fits (mean absolute differences of 0.043 and 0.032). However, 
even in these cases the fit is quite close, suggesting the log-normal distribution is an 
appropriate approximation to the subjective CDF. 
 
4. Expectations about Employment 
Figure 2 shows the histogram of responses to the percent chance of being employed in 
New Zealand as expressed by the PAC ballot losers in Tonga. The vertical line at 75.4 
percent shows the actual employment rate in New Zealand at the time of our survey for 
the PAC ballot winners. It is immediately clear that on average potential emigrants are 
underestimating the likelihood of being employed. 
 
Table 2 explores this further by presenting the mean and quantiles of this distribution. 
The mean percent chance of being employed expected by potential emigrants is 57.2 
percent. This is lower than both the 72.7 percent employment rate that they currently 
have in Tonga, and lower than the 75.4 percent employment rate of the PAC immigrants 
in New Zealand. When we break the data down by gender, we see that the 
underestimation seems to be coming only from males. Both males and females express an 
average percent chance of being employed in New Zealand of 57 percent, however   14
amongst our sample of PAC ballot winners in New Zealand, males have an 88 percent 
employment rate and females a 52 percent rate.
9 The confidence interval for the male 
expected rate covers rates all less than the rates in the confidence interval for the mean 
actual rate. In contrast, although the sample of female immigrants is relatively small, 
making the confidence intervals wide, the point estimates are close for the average 
expected rate and actual rate.  
 
5. Expectations about income in New Zealand 
5.1 Earnings Conditional on Working 
The first row of Table 3 presents the mean, standard deviation, and selected quantiles 
from the weekly wage distribution of PAC immigrants working in New Zealand. We 
wish to compare this actual wage distribution to the expectations that potential emigrants 
have about work income in New Zealand. To begin, Table 3 reports on the lowest and 
highest income amounts that PAC ballot losers say they would be earning if currently 
working in New Zealand. The mean lowest amount is $212 per week, and mean highest 
amount is $551 per week. Even this highest amount is lower than the mean actual work 
income of $564 per week earned by the PAC immigrants.  
 
The bottom of Table 3 then presents the mean and different quantiles of the estimated 
conditional earnings distribution for each individual. The means of the mean and median 
expected weekly earnings in New Zealand are $337 and $303. Comparing these to the 
mean ($564) and median ($515) of the actual distribution of wages, we see that both are 
                                                 
9 Note that these employment rates reflect conditions at the time of the survey. It is possible that policy 
changes intended to make it easier for migrants to take up job offers could have increased employment 
rates since this time (see Gibson and McKenzie, 2006 for early evidence).   15
only 59-60 percent of the actual earnings. That is, potential emigrants are underestimating 
earnings by 40 percent. This underestimation occurs across the whole distribution, but 
appears proportionately larger at the bottom of the distribution. The mean 10
th percentile 
of expected earnings is only 54 percent of the 10
th percentile of actual earnings, and the 
mean 90
th percentile of expected earnings is 73 percent of the 90
th percentile of actual 
earnings. The mean 90
th percentile of expected earnings is $512, which is still less than 
the mean of actual earnings. 
 
Figure 3 show kernel densities of the actual wage distribution for PAC immigrants in 
New Zealand, and kernel densities of the mean, median, 10
th, and 90
th percentiles of the 
expected wage distribution of ballot losers. All the expected wage distributions are 
shifted to the left compared to the actual wage distribution – again showing the general 
tendency to understate earnings. The 90
th percentile distribution is more spread out, and 
has positive mass between $800 and $1350, showing some potential emigrants expect the 
upside of earnings in New Zealand to be quite high. However, the proportion expecting 
this still seems too low relative to the realized data: 13 percent of potential emigrants 
expect to have a one in ten chance of having incomes above $800 if they work, giving a 
predicted 1.3 percent of individuals with incomes above this level at any given time. 
However, in practice we observe 3 out of the 48 immigrant workers (6 percent) having 
wage income above $800 in New Zealand. The small sample sizes make such 
comparisons suggestive only, but they at least do not show evidence of overestimation of 
incomes, even at the very top of the distribution. 
   16
5.2 Unconditional Earnings 
The unconditional distribution of expected earnings can then be obtained by combining 
the conditional earnings distribution with data on the expected probability of being 
employed. Since the income from work is zero if the individual is not working, we have 
for work income y: 
P(yi | φi) = P(yi |zi =1, φi) P(zi =1)  
where zi = 1 indicates that individual i is employed in New Zealand and φi  is  i's 
information set. Combining the elicited expectations about the probability of employment 
given in Figure 2 with the conditional earnings distributions in Table 3 we obtain the 
unconditional earnings distributions.  
 
Table 4 reports the actual unconditional earnings distribution of immigrants in New 
Zealand and compares this to the expected unconditional distribution. The mean of the 
mean expected earnings is $196 per week, only 46 percent of the actual mean earnings of 
$423. The mean of median expected earnings is $178, only 40 percent of the actual 
median earnings of $445. That is the combination of individuals underestimating the 
likelihood of being employed if in New Zealand and underestimating the earnings they 
will get if employed leads to large underestimation of unconditional earnings. 
 
5.3 Do expectations help predict actual decisions? 
The importance of the finding that potential emigrants underestimate incomes to be 
earned abroad depends in part on whether or not these expectations play a role in the 
decision to migrate. Classic theories of migration, such as Sjaastad (1962) and Harris and   17
Todaro (1970) predict that expectations of incomes and employment abroad should 
matter. To examine whether expectations help predict actual decisions in our data, we 
compare the unconditional income expectations of ballot losers to those of individuals 
who did not apply for the Pacific Access Category. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the 
median expected income is positively and significantly associated with the decision to 
apply for this migration category. Furthermore, this continues to be true after controlling 
for an individual’s pre-application income and employment status. Expecting $100 more 
income after migrating is associated with a 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood 
of applying for migration. Thus, although our sample is relatively small, there is evidence 
that these expectations do predict economic behavior. 
 
6. What explains the underestimation of income? 
The above results show that Tongan would-be emigrants substantially underestimate the 
incomes they could earn in New Zealand. We now explore several explanations for these 
results, guided by the anthropological literature, discussions with our survey team, and 
our knowledge of the PAC procedure.  
 
6.1 Poor expectations in general? 
A first explanation for the underestimation of employment and income possibilities in 
New Zealand is that the questions were not well understood by the survey participants. 
Or even if the questions are understood, individuals may be poor at forming expectations 
even about events for which they have more direct experience. To check against this, we 
asked the immigrants in New Zealand analogous questions as to their percent chance of   18
being employed, and to the income earned, if they were working in Tonga at the time of 
the survey. Since all are recent emigrants from Tonga, and most were working there, one 
should expect them to have reasonably accurate expectations. 
 
Table 6 compares the expectations the immigrants in New Zealand have about work in 
Tonga to their own previous experiences and to the experiences of the group of PAC 
ballot losers. For employment, the mean and median expected chances of working are 68 
percent and 80 percent. This compares well to both their own prior employment rate 
(80%) and to the current employment rate of ballot losers (73%). When we look at males 
and females separately, we find that the mean expected percent chance of employment 
expressed by males is less than that of females, despite males having higher past 
employment rates. Nevertheless, the median expected percent chance of being employed 
for males is 80 percent, close to the actual prior rate of 83 percent.  
 
When we consider conditional income expectations, we find that the expectations again 
seem fairly accurate when comparing to income prior to emigration. The mean of the 
mean expected earnings is 158 pa’anga, compared to a mean prior income of 154 pa’anga 
and a mean income among the ballot losers of 189 pa’anga. So the immigrants may not 
incorporate wage growth and inflation that have occurred since they left Tonga, but 
otherwise express expectations very close to their own experiences.  
 
 
   19
6.2 Very lucky immigrants? 
A second explanation for the difference between subjective expectations and the realized 
outcomes of immigrants is that the immigrants all happened to receive very high draws 
from their subjective earnings distributions. To see how lucky immigrants would have 
had to have been for this to explain the difference, we draw an income from the estimated 
subjective conditional earnings distributions for each would-be emigrant, and use this to 
construct an estimate of the mean expected earnings among the would-be emigrants. We 
do this 10,000 times. In only 2 out of these 10,000 draws do we obtain a subjective mean 
equal to or greater than the actual mean conditional income for immigrants of $564. 
Moreover, we get a subjective mean no more than 10 percent below the actual mean in 
only 10 out of the 10,000 draws, and a subjective mean no more than 20 percent below 
the actual mean in only 33 out of the 10,000 draws. Therefore it appears extremely 
unlikely that the large gap between expected and actual earnings can be attributed to the 
immigrants all receiving very good draws from their subjective earnings distributions.
10 
 
6.3 Comparison to the wrong reference group 
Our survey allows us to compare the expectations of PAC ballot losers to the realized 
outcomes of PAC ballot winners at the same point in time. However, although we have 
complete information on how PAC ballot winners fare in New Zealand, it appears 
unlikely that individuals in Tonga do. A third potential explanation for the understated 
                                                 
10 Of course these calculations assume that draws from the subjective distributions are independent across 
individuals. In practice all individuals could receive a common positive shock. However, consider the very 
extreme case of perfectly correlated draws, so that if one individual draws from the 95
th percentile of his or 
her subjective distribution, all other would-be emigrants also draw from this percentile of their 
distributions. Even in the case, the probability of getting a mean subjective income of $564 or higher is 
only 0.067.   20
employment probabilities and expected income is therefore that it arises from forming 
expectations on the basis of information coming from the wrong reference group. We 
consider two possible likely reference groups. The first is that PAC ballot losers have 
received some information about how the winners are doing, but have only heard about 
the experiences of individuals whose initial job offers fell through. The second is that 
PAC ballot losers base their expectations on the experiences of earlier cohorts of 
migrants. 
Feedback from migrants whose job offers fell through? 
The Pacific Access Category requires individuals with successful ballots to obtain a job 
offer before immigrating to New Zealand. The job offer must be for “ongoing and 
sustainable employment” and should be a full-time job which pays salary or wages (not 
commission or self-employment) and which complies with employment law in New 
Zealand. Despite having a job offer, our survey found that only 39 percent of the Tongan 
immigrants coming through the PAC during our sample period actually worked in the job 
that they had the offer for upon arriving in New Zealand. Amongst those not taking up 
the job offer, 68 percent found that the job was no longer available upon moving to New 
Zealand, due in large part to the time elapsing between filing their residence application, 
having it approved, and actually moving to New Zealand.
11  
 
As a result of this, a potential explanation for the low income expectations is that 
potential emigrants may have heard from friends and relatives that job offers would 
disappear by the time of immigration, leading new immigrants to have to search for new 
                                                 
11 Gibson and McKenzie (2006) provide more details of how this job offer functions in practice, and show 
that the proportion of immigrants taking up their job offer increased after a policy change in October 2004.   21
jobs and to take up jobs which are lower paid. Alternatively, even if information is 
available from both those taking up their initial jobs and those not doing so, the 
psychological literature suggests individuals may place disproportionate weight on 
negative outcomes compared to positive.
12  
 
The second row of Table 3 shows that although the income earned by immigrants not 
taking up their initial job offer is lower than the average immigrant income, it is still 
much higher than the expected income. The mean and median work income of 
immigrants who did not start work in the job for which they had their initial job offer is 
$520. The mean of the mean expected income ($337) is still only 65 percent of this.
13 
 
We can test for possible information flow from PAC migrants to ballot losers using GPS 
coordinates collected on the locations in Tonga of houses of ballot losers and of the 
houses where migrants lived before migrating (and where some family member of the 
migrant is likely to remain). We use this to measure the distance of PAC ballot losers 
from the closest emigrant who didn’t take up their initial job offer, and the proportion of 
PAC emigrants who didn’t take up their initial job offer within a 6km radius of the house 
of the ballot loser. The first two columns of Table 7 show no significant effect of distance 
to PAC emigrants on conditional income expectations, with the signs of the coefficients 
showing, if anything, higher expected incomes for ballot losers living closer to those who 
didn’t take up their initial job offer. 
                                                 
12 Montgomery (1998) discusses the psychological evidence for this, and suggests in a developing country 
setting that negative outcomes could play a disproportionate role in expectations about child mortality. 
13 Similarly, if we relate the expected income to a hypothetical migrant income based on the offered wages 
(even when these offers were not taken up), the underestimation is just as large. The mean and median 
offered wages were $528 and $480.   22
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 then consider the effect on expectations about being 
employed if they migrate to New Zealand. Here we do find significant effects of distance. 
Ballot losers who live closer to any PAC migrants who didn’t take up their initial job 
offer expect lower likelihoods of being employed in New Zealand. Column 4 shows the 
size of the effect to be reasonably large. Individuals for which all PAC migrants within a 
6 kilometer radius did not take up the initial job offer say they have a 19.6 percentage 
point lower likelihood of being employed. The constant term is 63%, and 65% if no 
controls other than the proportion of emigrants within 6km not taking up their initial job 
offer are used. Both of these are lower than the actual employment rate of 75% 
experienced by migrants in New Zealand, suggesting that feedback from migrants with 
bad experiences explains some, but not all of the low employment expectations. Overall, 
these results therefore suggest that proximity to the houses of migrants who did not take 
up their initial job offer lowers expectations about employment in New Zealand, but has 
no sizeable or significant effect on expected incomes conditional on working. 
Basing expectations on earlier cohorts 
Potential migrants may also base their expectations on the experiences of earlier cohorts 
of Tongans migrating to New Zealand. Unemployment rates for Pacific Islanders in New 
Zealand have fallen sharply over the last decade, with the male unemployment rate 
falling from 15.2% in 1996 to 6.8% in 2005. Using the New Zealand Income Survey, we 
can look more closely at recent Tongan migrants in New Zealand (e.g. individuals who 
have lived in New Zealand for five or less years). Averaging over 1997-99, the 
percentage of 20-46 year olds employed was 44%, rising to 53% over 2001-03. While 
PAC migrants, as economic migrants coming with job offers, have higher employment   23
rates than other Tongan migrants, who mostly come in through family reunification 
categories, the mean percent chance expected of employment in New Zealand of 57 
percent is not inconsistent with employment expectations being based on the experiences 
of earlier migrants. 
 
Pay increases for wage workers in Tonga are relatively rare, with public sector workers 
not receiving pay increases between 1996 and 2005. Thus, basing income expectations on 
experiences several years ago is quite accurate in Tonga, and potential migrants may 
expect the same to apply in New Zealand. Mean (median) wage incomes conditional on 
working for recent Tongan migrants aged 20-46, expressed in 2004 New Zealand dollars, 
average $416 ($393) over 1997-99, and $509 ($470) over 2001-03. The mean mean and 
mean median expected wage incomes of $337 and $298 are thus 81% (76%) of the 1997-
99 mean (median). So it is possible that low expectations of incomes are driven in part by 
potential migrants basing their experiences on average migrants migrating almost ten 
years before them. However, this would still then raise the question as to why potential 
migrants from a country with very large migrant networks do not have more recent labour 
market information. 
 
6.4 Psychological Effects of Losing the Ballot Draw? 
We asked the expectations questions at a time when individuals already knew whether or 
not their name had been drawn in the ballot. A fourth possibility for the understated 
expectations is that ballot losers attempt to make themselves feel better about losing in 
the ballot by downplaying the employment and income possibilities abroad. The fact that   24
individuals can apply again for the PAC ballot the next year may reduce such an effect, 
but it may still be present. To examine this possibility, we consider also the expectations 
of the third group in our sample: individuals whose name was drawn in the ballot, but 
who had not yet migrated. These individuals were typically in the process of trying to 
find job offers or waiting for their applications to be processed, and the majority of them 
migrated after our survey.
14  
 
We should expect any psychological effects to be much less severe for this group of 
ballot winners still in Tonga. However, they have very similar expectations to the group 
of ballot losers. The mean percent change of working if in New Zealand is 54 percent, 
compared to 57 percent for ballot losers. The mean (median) expected wage income 
conditional on working is $382 ($337) compared to $337 ($303) for ballot losers. These 
are still substantially below the actual employment rates and incomes of the migrants, 
suggesting that psychological effects of losing the ballot are not playing an important role 
in the understated expectations of the ballot losers. 
 
6.5 Extended Family trying to Moderate Remittance Demands? 
The Tongan-born population in New Zealand was 17,682 by the time of the 2001 Census, 
compared to a population in Tonga of just over 100,000. As a result, many Tongans know 
someone in New Zealand, who may be a source of information about job opportunities. 
Those applying to move to New Zealand under the PAC have more relatives in New 
Zealand than those not applying (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2006). Among our 
                                                 
14 Approximately 75% of ballot winners still in Tonga at the time of our survey had migrated to New 
Zealand as of 22 September 2006.   25
sample of PAC ballot losers, 51 percent have a parent or parent-in-law in New Zealand, 
87 percent have a sibling or sibling-in-law, 55 percent have an aunt or uncle, and 53 
percent have a cousin.  
 
Extended family such as uncles, aunts and cousins are an important source of 
remittances, with 43 percent of all remittances coming from extended family (McKenzie, 
2006). However, the remittance demands from extended family are seen by many as a 
burden on migrants. Based on her study of Tongan migrants in Australia, anthropologist 
Helen Lee writes that 
 “these young people often argue that it is important to meet the needs of the immediate family before 
others, and while they uphold the importance of respect and of ties to the extended family, many believe 
that obligations to extended family create unwarranted demands on families already struggling to make 
ends  meet”.            Lee  (2003,  p155) 
 
One mechanism that immigrants might use to try and mitigate the pressure to remit to 
extended family, or to at least reduce the level of remittances sought, might be to claim 
that they are earning less than they actually are. If this is the case, conditional on the total 
immigrant network that potential emigrants have in New Zealand, we should expect them 
to have lower expectations of income if this network includes extended family. 
 
Table 8 explores this hypothesis by regressing the median
15 expected earnings 
conditional on working on usual wage equation variables (age, sex, years of education), 
usual wage income in Tonga which should proxy for other labor market attributes, a 
                                                 
15 Similar results were obtained using mean expected earnings, and also for other quantiles.   26
dummy variable for whether or not the individual had been to New Zealand before the 
PAC ballot, and the total immigrant network, measured as the number of different types 
of relatives an individual has in New Zealand.
16 Columns 1 and 2 then include dummy 
variables for having an immigrant uncle/aunt and immigrant cousin respectively. We see 
that these are significantly negatively associated with lower income expectations in New 
Zealand. Columns 3, 4 and 5 show that in contrast, immigrant siblings and immigrant 
parents are positively associated with income expectations. Column 6 then enters both of 
the extended family indicators, uncle/aunt and cousin. While neither is individually 
significant, they are both negative, and strongly jointly significant (p-value=0.006). 
 
Table 9 carries out the analogous regressions for the percent chance of being employed in 
New Zealand. In contrast to the conditional income regressions, we do not see significant 
or sizeable associations with the presence of immediate or extended family in New 
Zealand. Employment status of migrants is likely to be something more verifiable than 
earnings (other community members abroad will likely observe whether or not a migrant 
is working, but not their income). Thus if extended family are trying to moderate 
remittance demands, it seems plausible that they would be able to do so more readily 
through less accurate information on income earned, than through misreporting their 
employment status. 
 
These results thus show that having extended family in New Zealand lowers expected 
earnings, conditional on total family network size. This might be entirely rational if 
                                                 
16 This is a count from zero to nine, based on questions asking whether the potential migrant has each of the 
following in New Zealand: father or father-in-law, mother or mother-in-law, brother or brother-in-law, 
sister or sister-in-law, child or child-in-law, grandparent, aunt or uncle, cousin, nephew or niece.   27
extended family members are less useful than immediate family members in helping new 
immigrants find good jobs in New Zealand. In column 1 of Table 10 we therefore 
reestimate the last column of Table 8, but this time for actual income earned by PAC 
immigrants in New Zealand. We use the coefficients from this equation to predict what 
the PAC ballot losers would earn in New Zealand. We take the difference between this 
predicted amount and their mean expected amount as a measure of the degree of 
underestimation of income. 
 
Column 3 of Table 10 then examines the correlates of the degree of underestimation. 
Having an immigrant uncle or aunt, or an immigrant cousin in one’s migrant network is 
strongly associated with underestimating the income that can be earned in New Zealand. 
We also see that males tend to underestimate income by more than females, and that 
those with more years of education are less likely to underestimate income.  
 
One concern with these results is that the predicted income is based on a sample size of 
only 48 principal applicants working in New Zealand. A particular concern is that the 
coefficient on years of education is negative in equation (1), and very imprecise. This is 
the result of small sample size and the influence of a couple of individuals who are 
working while attending tertiary institutions. Hourly wages have a positive and 
insignificant relationship with years of schooling for the same sample. Therefore, in 
column 2 of Table 10 we reestimate the earnings equation for the full sample of 74 
workers amongst the PAC immigrant households. This leads to a positive coefficient on 
years of education. Column 4 uses the predicted income from column 2. We again find   28
that potential emigrants with cousins in New Zealand and males are more likely to 
underestimate income, while those with more education do less underestimation. Having 
an uncle or aunt in New Zealand is now negative and insignificant, although it is positive 
and insignificant if we omit cousin from this equation. 
 
Comparing Column 2 of Table 10 to column 6 of Table 8 also shows these differences. 
Potential emigrants get the signs right on most variables: they expect wages to rise with 
their incomes in Tonga, years of education, age, previous experience in New Zealand, 
and total migrant network. However, males and those with cousins in New Zealand 
expect to earn less, whereas these characteristics are associated with immigrants earning 
more in New Zealand. In Column 5 of Table 10, we examine the interaction between 
gender and having a cousin in New Zealand. This interaction is negative and 
insignificant. Therefore females are just as affected by having cousins in New Zealand as 
males, if not more so. 
 
6.6 No male wage premium in Tonga? 
Table 6 shows that male and female immigrants have very similar expectations of the 
wages that they would earn if they were working in Tonga. Mean expected wages are 158 
pa’anga for males and 157 pa’anga for females. These are close to the mean prior 
incomes of 146 pa’anga for males and 172 pa’anga for females. Among our sample of 
unsuccessful ballots, we also find that females have higher mean incomes than males, 
although the difference is not significant. 
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In Table 11, we explore the differences in work income between male and female 
workers in Tonga after controlling for years of education, age, and marital status. 
Restricting ourselves only to principal applicants for the Pacific Access Category, we see 
males having a positive and insignificant wage premium for the prior income of 
immigrants in New Zealand, and a negative and insignificant wage premium for the 
current income of unsuccessful ballots. We then look to broader samples of workers in 
Tonga. Column 3 shows that for all Tongan wage workers in our survey, the male 
dummy is negative, small, and statistically insignificant, while Column 4 shows a small 
positive and insignificant coefficient using the Tongan Labor Force survey. It therefore 
appears that there is no male wage premium in Tonga. We can not reject that male and 
female workers of the same age and education earn the same amount. 
 
Tongan workers moving to New Zealand therefore face quite a different wage 
distribution than they do in Tonga. In particular, columns 5 and 6 of Table 11 show that 
male immigrants under the PAC earn significantly more than female immigrants. Male 
principal applicants earn $163 more per week on average than female principal 
applicants. Recall that the degree of male underestimation of income in New Zealand 
relative to females was $165-187 in Table 10. Therefore almost all of the male difference 
in underestimating earnings in New Zealand can be accounted for by the male wage 
premium in New Zealand. Looking more broadly at all Pacific Island immigrants in New 
Zealand, column 7 also shows a substantial male wage premium, similar in size to that 
obtained from our sample in column 6.  
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The male wage premium for Tongan immigrants in New Zealand appears to result from 
differences in occupation among male and female migrants. Typical jobs for the male 
immigrant workers in our survey include builder, welder, construction worker, carpenter, 
technician, and factory worker. Typical jobs for female immigrants include cleaner, sales 
assistant, and grocery packer. In contrast, although some of immigrants worked in similar 
positions in Tonga, both men and women also worked in more white-collar jobs, such as 
teaching, banking services, and as government employees. 
 
6.7 Comparing explanations 
We have found that potential emigrants tend to underestimate both their likelihood of 
working and the income they can earn when working in New Zealand. The low 
expectations of employment appear to be driven in part by potential migrants 
overweighting the experiences of migrants who were unable to take up their initial job 
offer, and may also be due to potential migrants basing expectations too much on the 
experiences of earlier cohorts who migrated when unemployment rates for Tongans in 
New Zealand were much higher.  
 
The underestimation of income appears to result in large part from the presence of 
extended family members such as cousins, uncles and aunts in the information network of 
potential migrants. These cousins, aunts and uncles appear to be offsetting the pressure to 
send remittances to extended family by downplaying their earnings in New Zealand. The 
tendency of males to underestimate income may be due to the fact that there is a large   31
gender gap in earnings in New Zealand, but not in Tonga. However, it is not clear why 
knowledge of this gender gap has not passed back to potential emigrants in Tonga. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We have combined a natural experiment on emigration with survey data on would-be 
emigrant’s expectations about employment and incomes in the migration destination. 
Contrary to anecdotal stories which raise fears of over-optimistic expectations, we find 
striking evidence that emigrants tend to underestimate the employment likelihood and the 
income they can earn abroad. The degree of underestimation appears to be in due to 
potential migrants placing excess weight on negative employment experiences of a few 
migrants, to extended family lowering remittance pressure, and to changes in the male 
wage premium between Tonga and New Zealand. They suggest that more accurate 
information about earnings opportunities abroad may actually increase migration 
pressure. 
 
More broadly, our work demonstrates the feasibility of asking probabilistic expectations 
questions to individuals in developing countries, even in cases in which the event for 
which expectations are elicited is not one for which the individual has direct prior 
experience.  Since individual decisions are driven by their subjective expectations, the 
large gap we find between realized outcomes for immigrants and expected outcomes for 
comparable would-be emigrants suggests that inference based on realized outcomes alone 
may be very misleading. 
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Respondent 1: F = (0.6, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8) 































Respondent 3: F=[0.2, 0.45, 0.5, 0.6] 































Respondent 30: F=[0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 1.00] 































Respondent 64: F=[0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.75] 
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Figure 2: Histogram of Expectations
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Figure 3: Conditional Earnings Distributions of
Actual and Expected Weekly Earnings in New ZealandTable 1: Summary statistics for New Zealand and Tongan samples
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Percent male 64.6 51.3
Years of Education 12.7 1.8 11.6 2.4
Age 33.2 8.2 33.7 6.2
Percent married 69.2 64.1
Total Migrant Network in New Zealand before applying 4.1 1.5 3.6 1.3
Usual income in Tonga 123.1 107.4 138.2 121.2
Usual income in Tonga conditional on working 154.5 97.9 188.5 102.3
Percent employed while in Tonga 80.0 73.1
Sample Size 65 78
Table 2: Actual and Expected Employment Rates in New Zealand
# obs Mean S.D. 25th Median 75th 95% C.I. for the mean
Percent of PAC principal applicants employed in NZ 65 75.4 [64.6, 86.1]
     male migrants 42 88.1 [77.9, 98.3]
     female migrants 23 52.2 [30.1, 74.3]
Percent of PAC ballot losers employed in Tonga 78 72.7
Percent chance that they…
  Would be working for pay if living in NZ now 77 57.2 18.8 50 55 60 [53.0, 61.5]
      for males 40 57.0 20.7 50 60 80 [50.4, 63.6]
      for females 37 57.5 16.7 50 55 60 [51.9, 63.1]
Percent saying percent chance of working in NZ<75% 77 76.6
Tongans who applied
to migrate to New Zealand
but had unsuccessful ballots
Tongan migrants
in New Zealand
through Pacific Access CategoryTable 3: Actual and Expected Conditional Weekly Income Distributions
Weekly income in New Zealand dollars conditional on working
Mean S.d. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Actual Income:
Actual Income for Migrants in NZ  564 283 360 431 515 622 700
Income for Migrants who did not take up initial job offer 520 153 360 434 520 642 692
Expected Income:
Lowest amount expected by those in Tonga 212 108 100 100 200 300 300
Highest amount expected by those in Tonga 551 293 200 300 500 900 1000
Expected earnings distribution
   Mean of expected earnings 337 191 111 172 298 501 615
    5th percentile 173 145 20 57 131 242 391
   10th percentile 195 153 29 70 148 268 430
   25th percentile 238 169 49 94 196 341 495
   50th percentile 303 191 85 132 265 479 576
   75th percentile 394 220 135 211 364 578 713
   90th percentile 512 271 208 301 459 676 935
   95th percentile 608 330 298 368 526 782 1117
Table 4: Actual and Expected Unconditional Weekly Income Distributions
Weekly work income in New Zealand dollars, whether or not working
Mean S.d. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Actual Income for Migrants in NZ  423 347 0 72 445 600 692
Expected earnings distribution
   Mean of expected earnings 196 122 58 103 186 263 344
    5th percentile 102 88 8 30 85 130 251
   10th percentile 114 94 12 38 100 147 267
   25th percentile 140 105 19 52 134 188 301
   50th percentile 178 120 33 81 174 243 333
   75th percentile 230 142 64 123 219 313 384
   90th percentile 297 174 109 159 271 401 514
   95th percentile 350 208 139 201 320 449 614
Table 5: Do expectations help predict the desire to migrate?
Dependent variable: Dummy for whether or not they applied for the Pacific Access Category
(1) (2)
Median of unconditional expected income ('00s) 0.120*** 0.103**
(0.043) (0.047)
Income in 2003 in Tonga ('00s) 0.0360
(0.088)
Employment status in 2003 in Tonga -0.0579
(0.13)
Observations 131 128
Note: marginal effects from probit estimation over sample of non-applicants and ballot losers
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 6: Expectations of Migrants in New Zealand about work in Tonga
Mean S.D. 25th Median 75th 95% C.I. for the mean
Employment
Actual Employment
Percent of Migrants employed in Tonga before migrating 80.0 [70.0, 89.9]
     males 83.3 [71.5, 95.1]
     females 73.9 [54.5, 93.3]
Percent of Unsucessful ballots employed in Tonga 2005 72.7
Expected Employment
Percent chance that migrants would be working for pay
if they were living in Tonga now 67.5 37.3 30 80 100
     males 64.8 37.5 30 80 100
     females 72.4 37.1 40 90 100
Conditional Income (for those working) 
Actual Income
Income in Tonga before migration 154 98 80 128 200 [127, 182]
     males 146 95 80 123 165 [113, 179]
     females 172 104 80 152 250 [118, 225]
Income of Unsuccessful ballots in 2005 189 102 100 155 250 [161, 216]
     males 163 81 100 130 220 [130, 196]
     females 211 115 120 180 280 [168, 255]
Expectations of Income if working in Tonga
Mean of expected earnings 158 147 68 106 162
     males 158 146 70 110 162
     females 157 153 53 98 163
Median of expected earnings 122 121 45 85 131
     males 128 131 50 89 123
     females 111 101 43 66 160
All income amounts are expressed in Tongan pa'anga.Table 7: Do expectations vary with distance to houses of PAC migrants?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Usual Weekly Income in Tonga 0.522*** 0.538*** 0.0223 0.0146
(0.17) (0.16) (0.025) (0.025)
Distance to closest Emigrant house (km) 5.781 -0.132
(17.9) (2.07)
Distance to closest house of emigrant who -3.208 0.812*
didn't take up initial job offer (km) (3.23) (0.44)
Proportion of emigrants with houses in  28.56 -19.59**
6km radius who didn't take up job offer (78.4) (8.75)
Constant 238.0*** 218.4*** 50.96*** 63.08***
(37.6) (42.1) (4.46) (5.60)
Observations 74 74 75 75
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Columns 3 and 4 also control for employment status in Tonga in 2003 and 2004.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Correlates of Median Expected Earnings in New Zealand
Dependent Variable: Median of Expected Earnings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Usual Weekly Income in Tonga 0.357** 0.385** 0.335* 0.341* 0.343* 0.390**
(2.07) (2.25) (1.90) (1.84) (1.80) (2.37)
Years of Education 16.71** 17.18** 12.56 13.75* 13.87* 18.79***
(2.34) (2.43) (1.58) (1.81) (1.80) (2.70)
Male Dummy -62.48 -69.93 -88.57* -74.68 -72.26 -62.03
(-1.36) (-1.50) (-1.77) (-1.56) (-1.50) (-1.37)
Age 1.346 2.155 1.516 0.685 1.000 2.216
(0.41) (0.69) (0.46) (0.21) (0.31) (0.70)
Had been to NZ before 2000 65.82 60.30 60.75 65.68 66.48 61.84
(1.35) (1.25) (1.25) (1.34) (1.37) (1.28)
Total Migrant Network 16.95 19.36 -0.463 3.966 5.774 23.60
(0.97) (1.05) (-0.024) (0.22) (0.35) (1.35)
Has a Migrant Uncle/Aunt -97.89** -76.86
(-2.21) (-1.55)
Has a Migrant Cousin -96.22** -72.13
(-2.22) (-1.51)
Has a Migrant Brother 58.53
(1.08)
Has a Migrant Sister 24.25
(0.54)
Has a Migrant Parent 13.79
(0.31)
Constant 17.84 -26.62 43.56 59.80 51.62 -37.01
(0.11) (-0.17) (0.26) (0.36) (0.31) (-0.23)
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.28
Robust t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Median expected Percent chance
conditional earnings of being employedTable 9: Correlates of Expectations about employment in New Zealand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed in Tonga in 2004 3.751 4.572 3.828 3.043 3.699 5.037
(0.58) (0.76) (0.62) (0.48) (0.58) (0.80)
Usual Weekly Income in Tonga 0.0249 0.0265 0.0260 0.0272 0.0267 0.0244
(0.87) (0.99) (0.95) (1.00) (0.95) (0.88)
Years of Education -0.599 -0.287 -0.464 -0.439 -0.414 -0.454
(-0.67) (-0.29) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.44) (-0.47)
Male Dummy 2.500 3.205 2.483 3.185 3.053 2.601
(0.52) (0.71) (0.52) (0.71) (0.65) (0.55)
Age -0.405 -0.318 -0.349 -0.350 -0.368 -0.337
(-1.32) (-0.95) (-1.01) (-1.05) (-1.15) (-1.06)
Had been to NZ before 2000 2.633 2.370 2.472 2.789 2.769 2.028
(0.51) (0.47) (0.49) (0.54) (0.53) (0.41)
Total Migrant Network -1.410 -0.466 -1.274 -0.423 -1.003 -0.803
(-0.73) (-0.24) (-0.59) (-0.21) (-0.57) (-0.41)
Has a Migrant Uncle/Aunt 5.252 6.934
(1.09) (1.36)
Has a Migrant Cousin -4.158 -6.246
(-0.90) (-1.25)
Has a Migrant Brother 2.366
(0.36)
Has a Migrant Sister -3.206
(-0.64)
Has a Migrant Parent 0.251
(0.061)
Constant 72.16*** 66.40*** 69.37*** 69.44*** 69.56*** 67.87***
(4.26) (3.54) (3.88) (3.97) (3.86) (3.74)
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10
Robust t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 10: Predicted Earnings and Overestimation relative to Predicted Earnings
Dependent Variable: Actual Work Income in New Zealand (columns 1 and 2)
                              Predicted Earnings Minus Mean Expected Earnings (columns 3, 4 and 5)
Principal All
Applicants Migrants based on (1) based on (2) based on (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Usual Weekly Income in Tonga 0.342 0.300 -0.0342 -0.0764 -0.0926
(0.87) (0.96) (-0.21) (-0.47) (-0.56)
Years of Education -11.74 6.784 -30.73*** -12.21* -12.77*
(-0.60) (1.12) (-4.22) (-1.68) (-1.75)
Male Dummy 138.8* 115.9** 187.3*** 164.5*** 196.6***
(1.71) (2.07) (4.11) (3.61) (2.79)
Age 2.682 0.269 1.483 -0.930 -0.684
(0.55) (0.082) (0.47) (-0.30) (-0.22)
Had been to NZ before 2000 79.42 80.11 25.59 26.28 17.04
(1.15) (1.56) (0.53) (0.54) (0.35)
Total Migrant Network 7.727 20.20 -20.44 -7.968 -9.207
(0.21) (0.67) (-1.17) (-0.46) (-0.54)
Has a Migrant Uncle/Aunt -101.3 -122.6** 193.5*** -30.37
(-1.10) (-2.02) (3.85) (-0.60)
Has a Migrant Cousin 102.8 136.7** 177.0*** 210.9*** 236.6***
(1.01) (2.18) (3.71) (4.42) (4.16)
Has a Migrant Cousin*Male -69.02
(-0.83)
Constant 407.7 197.3 388.1** 177.7 157.3
(1.35) (1.30) (2.34) (1.07) (0.88)
Observations 48 74 74 74 74
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.59 0.40 0.40
Robust t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Actual Income Degree of Underestimation
(Predicted-Expected Income)Table 11: Wages Conditional on Working in Tonga and in New Zealand
Prior income Current income All workers Tongan PAC All PAC All Pacific Island
of migrants of unsuccessful surveyed in Labor Force principal migrants migrants in NZ
in New Zealand ballots Tonga Survey applicants Income Survey
Male dummy 18.15 -27.70 -7.849 5.193 162.8 125.3** 122.42***
(0.68) (-0.99) (-0.54) (0.97) (1.64) (2.23) (6.08)
Years of Education 30.19*** 14.64 7.604*** 10.51*** -7.367 6.474 #
(3.60) (1.53) (2.97) (7.39) (-0.42) (1.22)
Age -20.51 -33.39 7.839*** -3.024 44.01 57.25 11.53**
(-1.48) (-1.06) (2.78) (-0.88) (0.91) (1.62) (2.07)
Age Squared 0.349* 0.541 -0.0714** 0.0638 -0.534 -0.766 -0.13**
(1.73) (1.18) (-2.22) (1.19) (-0.72) (-1.49) (1.96)
Married Dummy 33.49 -26.65 -7.603 20.19*** -105.9 -96.29 34.21
(1.31) (-0.78) (-0.46) (3.49) (-0.84) (-1.00) (1.40)
Constant 6.031 534.2 -89.75 -13.93 -204.9 -556.5 133.80
(0.026) (0.92) (-1.62) (-0.28) (-0.30) (-1.08) (1.19)
Sample Size 51 55 294 724 46 72 503
R-squared 0.47 0.26 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.16
Mean income: 154.5 188.5 167.6 102.4 590.6 533.5 519.2
Note: weekly work income in New Zealand is in New Zealand dollars 
# years of education not available in New Zealand IS, so dummies for different educational qualifications were included instead.
Weekly work income in Tonga (pa'anga) Weekly work income in NZ